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NOTE
A PRIMER ON THE BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY
AND THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of salinization of the Souris River flowing into
Canada, has brought the Garrison Diversion Project to the atten-
tion of officials in Canada. The Canadians have made it clear that
they want no degradation of water flowing into Canada.1 This has
brought to the fore the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the In-
ternational Joint Commission.2 It is time then to examine the
Treaty and see what applications, if any, it has to problems which
may result from trans-boundary pollution arising out of the Gar-
rision Project.
This note will examine the applicability of the treaty to Cana-
dian objections to Garrison Diversion by outlining the history of the
Treaty, and the reasons for its formulation. A detailed analysis of
the organizaion, functions and procedures of the International Joint
Commission established by the treaty will follow. The availability
of the Commission to the problems of individuals will be examined
in the last section of this note.
Nations enter into treaties with other nations to further their
own interest in a particular area.3 A treaty has been defined as "a
written agrreement by which two or more States or international
organizations create or intend to create a relation between them-
selves operating within the sphere of international law.'" Absent
such a specific agreement, there is no reason to believe that nations
would conduct their affairs in a manner not detrimental to neigh-
boring states. As Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist, No. VI:
To look for a continuation of harmony between a number
of independent unconnected sovereignties, situated in the
same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course
of human events and to set at defiance the accumulated
experiences of ages. 5
1. See Grand Forks Herald, Oct. 19, 1978, at 3, col. 1; Grand Forks Herald Sept. 17.
1973, at 1, col. 2.
2. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548.
3. See H. MORENTHAU, POLITICs AMONG NATIONS (1951).
4. MCNArR, TIE LAW OF TRET=is 4 (1961) (footnotes omitted).
5. A. HAA ILTON, J. MADISON, and J. JAy, THE FEDERALIST 25 (M. Beloff ed. 1948).
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Treaties are contracts of necessity, made with the intention of
avoiding the type of disagreements that lead to war.6 It is from
this perspective that we shall examine the Boundary Waters Treaty
'of 1909.7
II. HISTORY OF THE TREATY
In April of 1906, Mr. George Gibbons, the Canadian represent-
ative to the International Water Ways Commissions suggested to
his United States counterpart, Mr. George Clinton, that a treaty
be drafted to facilitate isettlement of disputes between the two coun-
tries with respect to international water.9 Negotiations were con-
ducted in 1907-08 and were extremely trying to both parties. 10 De-
spite difficulties,"' the negotiations resulted in terms that were not
totally agreeable to, but nonetheless were accepted by, the Cana-
dians .1 2
Two questions of equal importance that arise are: (1) Why did
the Canadians accept a treaty that varied considerably from what
they had originally hoped for; and (2) Why did the more power-
ful United States see the need for a treaty at all?13 To fully under-
stand a treaty, its origin and terms, one must understand the moti-
vation of framers.- As the treaty is essentially a political do-
cument, it is necessary to explore the state of relations between the
two powers 5 concerning water rights and other political issues 6 at
the time it was drafted. To understand the Canadian motives, it is
necessary to consider the relative power of Canada vis-avis the
United States in 1909.17 As Canada had no Ministry of External
Affairs, it was subject to the bargains negotiated by the British
6. See Speech by Benjamin Disraeli in the House of Lords, July 18, 1878, II SEcrED
SPEECHES OF THE LATE RIGHT HONORABLE THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD 199-200( (T.E: Kebbel
ed. 1882) (on the Berlin Treaty).
7. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548.
8. For a collection of the letters of George Gibbons relating to the Treaty, see Gibbons,
Sir George Gibbons and the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, 34 CAN. HIST. REV., No. 2,
at 124 (1953).
9. L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATER PROBLEMS OF CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES 11 (1958).
10. Gibbons, supra note 8, at 125.
11. Id.
12. L. BLOOmFLD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 9, at 48. Sir Wilfred Laurier (Canadian
Prime Minister) was always convinced that the treaty was a generous concession to the
United States. He wrote to Gibbons in 1909:
If I were to follow my own inclinations at the present time, we should decline
the treaty. Article II has always seemed to me a very serious source of trouble,
but in view of other concessions, I have been disposed to accept.
Id.
13. The Canadians believed that the United States would benefit from an ad hoc approach
to dispute settlement, in the absence of a treaty. See Gibbons, supra note 8, at 24.
14. McNAm, LAW OF TREATIES 6 (1961).
15. See A. BURT, CANADA (1942).
16. See L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, aupra note 9, 1-13, for a detailed history of
Canadian-American relations in regards to water prior to 1909.
17. A. BuRT, CANADA 1-9 (1942).
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Foreign Office.18 Canada's desire to bypass the British Foreign
Office and deal directly with the United States was emphasized in
a letter to Prime Minister Laurier: 19
Once the Americans come to deal directly with us they will
play the game fairly. It is only because we have got John
Bull around that they bully us. Once we get him out of the
game there will be no prestige in tackling a little fellow who
will kick their shins.20
Canada's desire not to lose negotiating ground or be forced
to rely on British intervention in international problems put them
at a disadvantage in the bargaining process .This allowed the Amer-
icans to be agressive in seeking terms that were favorable to them.
At the time the Boundary Waters Treaty was negotiated, the
Americans had a nationalistic interpretation of international riparian
law-generally referred to as the Harmon Doctrine. 21 This doctrine
states:
[Tihat the rules. . . of international law impose no duty
... upon the United States of denying to its inhabitants the
use of the water of that part of the Rio Grande lying en-
tirely within the United States, although such use results
in reducing the volume of water in the river below the point
where it ceases to be entirely within the United States. The
recognition of such a right is entirely inconsistent with the
sovereignty of the United States over its national domain.
2 2
The doctrine was in direct conflict with the existing precepts of inter-
national riparian law, and represented an extremely nationalistic
position.2 8 The prevailing interpretation of both international24 and
common law25 in regard to control of water by riparian owner was
ignored and the Harmon Doctrine was validated by the Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909.
18. Id. at 248, for an interesting history of the development of the Ministery of External
Affairs.
19. Letter from G. Gibbons to W. Laurier, P.M., Sept. 24, 1907, portions quoted in Gib-
bons. supra note 8, at 128.
20. Gibbons, supra note 8, at 128.
21. Judson Harmon was United States Attorney General from 1895-1897.
22. 21 Op. ATrr'Y GEN. 274 (1895).
23. See 1 L. OPPENHEIm, INTERNATIONAL LAW 321 (1920).
24. Note, The Development of International Law with Respect to Trans-Boundary Wate,
Resources: Co-operation for Mutual Advantage or Continentalism's Thin Edge of the Wedge?
9 OSGOOD HALL L.J. 261 (1971) citing Sir R. Borden, House of Commons Debates, III Sess.
l1th Parl., 1910-11 Vol. 1, at 903-04.
Just as the independent territorial supremacy does not give a boundless liberty
of action . . . a state is in spite of its territorial supremacy not allowed to
alter the natural conditions of its own territory to the disadvantage of the
natural conditions of the territory of a neighboring state, for instance to
stop or divert the flow of a river which runs from its owi into neighboring
territory/. (emphasis added).
Td. at 264.
25. $3 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, 599 (1939):
Every riparian owner may divert the water of a stream for purposes in con-
nection with his land, or for other purposes, but he is bound to return the
water which he has diverted into the stream again before it leaves his land
substantially undiminished in volume and unaltered in character.
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While an important part of the contracting parties' motivation
to enter a treaty is their individual self-interest, there must also be
a common ground of mutual self-interest. The boundary line be-
tween the United States and Canada is 3,500 miles long; at least
2,000 miles of the boundary are marked by navigable and non-navig-
able waters.2 6 Neighbors with a common boundary of this length
are bound to have occasional disputes. Establishing a system for
the resolution of conflicts benefits both parties and provides the
necessary common ground for an agreement. The Treaty of 1909 was
"the last step in the development of techniques for the avoidance
of such controversies. 27
II. THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION: HISTORY,
FUNCTIONS AND PROCEDURES.
The Boundary Waters Treaty provided for the creation of a
commission to facilitate the enforcement of its terms 2 which ap-
pears to have been a Canadian idea. 29 As the purpose of the Treaty
was to "prevent disputes between the contracting parties"30 the
Canadian representive felt that if the treaty was to mean anything,
and the rights of Canadians were to be protected, there would have
to be a commission to settle disputes and enforce the terms of the
treaty.31 The only alternative to a permanent commission that
was discussed was a system of ad hoc commissions made up of
local politicians, a system rejected by the Canadians, but favored
by the United States. 3 2 After vigorous negotiations, the idea of a
permanent commission was finally accepted and included in the
treaty.88
The commission has a double function under Article VIII:
[aldministrative, in the application by a system of permits,
of a legislative rule to particular cases as they arise; jud-
icial, in its procedure and in the adjustment of conflicting
interests on the basis of equity.34
26. L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 9, at 1.
27. Id.
28. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VII, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548.
29. See Gibbons, supra note 8, at 125.
30. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548.
31. Gibbons, supra note 8, at 127. In a letter to the Prime Minister in 1907, Gibbons said:
[t]here is only one way in which we will get fair play, and avoid a conflict
with them [Americans], and that is by a permanent joint commission which
will play the game fairly, and whose conclusions will be so justified by public
opinion, even in the United States as to compel their acceptance.
Id.
32. Id. at 125.
33. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VII, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548.
84. See McKay, The International Joint Cominission Between the United Statea and
Canada, 22 Am. J. INT'L. L. 292, 293 (1928).
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In other words, the commission is empowered to pass upon all ap-
plications for the use or obstuction or diversion of certain waters
along the international boundary,8 5 and in doing so "shall be
governed by. . .rules or principles which are adopted by the High
Contracting Parties for this purpose."0 Further, they are judicially
empowered to formulate remedial or protective works and to
provide for the protection and indemnity of adversely affected inter-
ests.81 The procedures used by the commission when considering ap-
plications are essentially judicial."8 The Commission has the powers
of investigation under Article IX and arbitration under Article X.39
To fully understand the International Joint Commission, its functions
will be examined separately, following a brief survey of its organi-
zation.40
A. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMISSION
The International Joint Commission is composed of six mem-
bers, three from the United States and three from Canada.41 Also,
both the United States and the Canadian sections have appointed sec-
retaries who act as joint secretaries at the Commissions' joint ses-
sions.42
Due to the technical nature of the work, the Commission norm-
ally appoints a board of experts which serves in an advisory cap-
acity.43 The usual procedure is the for the contracting parties to
assure the Commission that all the agencies and personnel of their
respective governments will be available as needed during the course
of the investigation.44 The authority to appoint a board is usually
found in the terms of the reference.45
B. FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION
The functions of the commission may be divided into four areas:
85. Id.
36. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VIII, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910). T.S. No. 548.
97. Id.
38. See McKay, supra note 34, at 294.
39. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, arts. IX, X, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548.
40. See CHIACKO, THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION (1932) ; ACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. I, 593-94, 617, 756-58, 760-62; Vol. II, 342-43, 344; Vol. VI, 4-5
(1944).
41. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VII, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548. The favored occu-
pations of the commissioners seems to be law and engineering. See McKay. supra note 34,
at 304.
42. McKay, supra note 34 at 314.
43. Note, The International Joint Commission (United States-Canada) and the interna-
tional Boundary and Water Commission (United States-Mexico) : Potential for Environ-
mental Control Along the Boundaries, 6 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 499, 507 (1973).
44. Letter from the Secretary of State to the United States Section, International Joint
Commission, April 1, 1946 (reprinted in IJC, Report on the Pollution of Boundary Waters
13 (1951)).
46. Reference is the name given to documents submitted to the Commission for a decision.
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jduicial, investigative, administrative, and arbitrative." These func-
tions with the excepon of the administrative function will be dis-
cussed individually from both a procedural and substantive perspec-
tive.
1. The Commission as a Judicial Body
Under Article VIII of the treaty, the commission:
shall have jurisdiction over and shall pass upon all cases
involving the use or obsrtuction or diversion of the waters
with respect to which under Articles IIH and IV... the approval
of this Commission is required."7
This Article gives the Commissin broad jurisdiction, which they
have had to define on occasion.4 8 The Treaty sets out certain rules
that the Commission is to follow when passing upon an application
involving the use or obstruction of boundary and trans-boundary
waters.4
9
The rules provide that the Commission shall observe the follow-
ing priority of uses in which both countries have equal and similar
rights on their own side of the boundary: (1) domestic and sanitary
purposes, (2) navigation, and (3) power and irrigation. The Commis-
sion may in their discretion, suspend the requirements for equal
division if it is not advantageous, because of local conditions or if
the division diminishes the amount available for use on the other
side. Approval from the Commission can be withheld for any use
or diversion until remedial or protective works are constructed for
the protection and indemnity against injury of any interests on
either side of the boundary. In cases which involve the elevation of
the natural waters on either side of the boundary, suitable and ade-
quate provision for the protection and indemnity of all interests on
either side of the line which may be injured is mandatory. 0
46. L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 9, at 17, 38, 53, 55.
47. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between tre United States
and Conada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VIII, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548. The Preliminary
Article defines boundary and trans-boundary waters:
For the purpose of this treaty boundary waters are defined as the waters
from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting water-
ways, or the portions thereof, along which the internationol boundary between
the United States and the Dominion of Canada passes, including all bays,
arms and inlets thereof, but not including tributary waters which in their
natural channels would flow into such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or waters
flowing from such lakes, rivers, and waterways, Or the waters of rivers flow-
ing across the boundary.
Id.
48. See McKay, supra note 34, at 295 citing Application of Greater Winnipeg Water Dis-
trict, Sept. 8, 1913, conditional approval, Jan. 14, 1914. Jurisdiction over obstructions in
water flowing from boundary waters, the tendency of which is to raise the level on the
other side of the boundary, is expressly delegated to the commission, while jurisdiction over
uses or diversions of such waters which would lower levels on the other side of the boundary
is not expressly included. The Commission settled the question by expanding their juris-
diction to cover the problem.
49. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VII, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548.
50. L. BLOoMrm E.D & G. FrrzaxaALD, supra note 9, at 19-20. "
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The Commission has jurisdiction in regard to both "boundary
waters," '51 and "waters flowing from waters and waters at a lower
level than the boundary in trans-boundary rivers. '52 This note
will concentrate on the Commission's jurisdiction over the trans-
boundary waters."
A summation of the various references which form the basis
of the Commission's jurisdiction is necessary.54 The Commission
has considered many applications under Article IV, the only article
in the Treaty which specifically mentions pollution. 5 Virtually all
the applications have been submitted by one of the governments
or the other.56 Apparently. the Commission has been swayed by the
argument that its jurisdiction is. limited to considering applications
of the governments only and not those of private interests.7 A
suggested reply to this argument is that the development of water
power is in private hands for the most part in both countries, and
such restrictive interpretation of the Treaty would frustrate the de-
velopment by the parties of an -important source of wealth and
this could not have been the meaning or the purpose of the treaty. 58
The Commission dismissed the one reference made by a private
party (not made through his government) for lack of jurisdiction. 59
51. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548.
52. Id.
53. The reason for this is that the primary purpose of this note is to examine the reme-
dies of Canadians aggrieved by changes in their environment caused by Garrison Diversion's
effect on two trans-boundary waterways, the Souris and Red Rivers.
54. For a complete analysis of the jurisdiction of the International Joint Commission, see
L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FrrzGERALD, supra note 9, at 21-28.
55. Id. at 24. Under Article IV the Commission has considered applications concerning
such matters as the adjustment of differences between drainage districts, dams and recla-
mation works. Id.
56. Id. at 26.
57. Id.
58. Kottenay Lake Storage, No. 27, cited in L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note
9, at 125, 127. The Canadian Government argued this point before the Commission. They
contended:
The Commission had jurisdiction to deal with an application by a private
enterprise. A contention to the contrary would defeat the whole object of
the Treaty. In most of the states bordering on the international boundary
line and In most of the Provinces of Canada, the economic development of
boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary was in the hands of
private Interests and corporations. An interpretation of the Treaty which ex-
cluded from its operation the development of power and irrigation resources
would frustrate the development of very substantial areas in both countries.
There was nothing in the Treaty to indicate that development by private in-
terests was excluded from its provisions and the fact that both governments
had for more than twenty-one years acquiesced in and acted upon rules of
procedure authorizing applications by private interests would seem to be con-
clusive.
Id. at 127.
59. Madawaska Company Docket No. 91, cited in L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITzGERAL,, supra
note 9, at 142-43:
The Saint John River Power Co., in reply, alleged that the Commission
had no Jurisdiction in the matter, and that the Madawaska Co. was not a
competent party. Private citizens [they] . . . argued, can appear before the
commission only in certain cases. Therefore, the Madawaska Co. was not
able to appear before the Commission under Art. IV, unless through its gov-
ernment and the Company had not done so.
Id. at 143. The application was denied for lack of jurisdiction.
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The problems individuals have under the Treaty shall be discussed
in depth at a later point.eo
A reading of the treaty and the references made pursuant to
it seems to indicate that the jurisdiction of the Commission is in-
deed limited to those "cases" brought to it by the contracting part-
ies.6 ' What remedy does an injured party have when the cause of
his injury is located in the terrority of the other party?6 2 Perhaps
the best example of this type of situation can be found in the Trail
Selter Dispute. 3 This dispute between Canada and the United
States lasted 13 years, from 1928 to 1941.64 A Canadian company
located on the Columbia River in British Columbia, a short dis-
tance from the boundary, was emmitting tremendous amounts of
sulphus dioxide gases into the air, which drifted across the bound-
ary and caused damage in the State of Washington. 65 The pro-
blem that the United States faced in trying to find relief for its
citizens is explained by Read:
The subject-matter of the dispute did not directly con-
cern the two governments; nor did it involve claims by
United States Citizens against the Canadian government. It
did not seem to come withing any of the ordinary categories
of arbitrable international disputes. It consisted rather of
claims based on nuisance, alleged to have been committed by
a Canadian corporation and to have caused damage to
United States citizens and property. . . . The United States
proposed to refer the questions at issue to the International
Joint Commission . . .and the Canadian government con-
curred; . . .66
The dispute was referred to the Commission under Article IX,_
which provides for investigation and recommendation, but not de-
cision.6 7 The Commission issued a unanimous report, assessing
damages against Canada, which Canada accepted, but the United
60. See text accompanying note 120, infra.
61. L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITzGERALD, supra note 9, at 26.
62. If the party is able to convince the Commission before it grants 'a permit that he wili
suffer a loss, the Commission may under Art. VIII:
subject its approval of the proposed works to certain conditions, including
the construction of remedial or protective works and making suitable and
adequate provision for the protection and indemnity against injury of any
interests on either side of the boundary.
Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and
Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VIII, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548.
63. Reports of Int's. Arbitral Awards, vol. I., 1905-82.
64. For an analysis of the Trail Smelter Dispute, see Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute,
1 CAN. YEAaBooK OF INTL. L. 213 (1963).
65. Id. at 213.
66. Id. at 213-14.
67. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. IX, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548, states:
The International Joint Commission is authorized in each case (of disputes
between the U.S. and Canada) . . . to examine into and report upon the
facts. . . . Such reports . . . shall not be regarded as decisions of the ques-
tions or matters submitted either on the facts or the law and in no way have
the character of a arbitral award.
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States rejected.68 This dispute led to the creation of a convention
which established a tribunal to settle the matter. 9
It can be seen from the Trail Smelter Dispute that the Commis-
sion can perform in an unbiased manner when called into an Inter-
national controversy, and is not susceptable to the usual squabbling
that is normally present when representatives get together to deter-
mine the rights of their respective countries under an international
agreement.7
0
Once judicial jurisdiction has been obtained by a contracting
party, what procedures does the Commission follow in "adjudicating"
the rights of the parties involved? There is a published set of pro-
cedural rules,71 but it has been suggested by one authority, that
these rules are not in fact the actual procedures followed by the
Commission; that the actual procedures can be found in the dock-
ets opened since 1958.72 According to this authority, the rules
pertinent to handling applications under Articles III and IV of the
Treaty read ,as though the Commission operates much like a court
of law with pleadings, pre-trial conference, a hearing at which the
witnesses are examined and cross examined by counsel, and a writ-
ten disposition of the application. After reading a transcript of a
hearing, however, one concludes that the Commission's hearings
resemble those of a legislative or administrative body rather than a
judicial one.7 8
In 1912 when the Commission first met, administrative procedure
was not yet a refined art and the framers of the rules of procedure
were lawyers, who naturally wished to work in the procedures with
which they were most familiar.74 Reviewing applications in a man-
ner usually associated with the adversary process would tend to
identify the parties as winners and losers rather than to create
an attitude of cooperation. Such an atmosphere is not conducive
to international negotiations.7 5
The procedure laid out in the rules is a simple one.7 6 An appli-
cation is presented to the Commission from either government
77
68. Reports of Int'l Arbitral Awards, vol. III, 1905, 1918-19.
69. See Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941) printed in 35 Am. J.
INT'L. L. 684, 713 (1941).
70. See A. McNair, International Law in Practice, XXXII THE GROTIUS SocIr TRANS-
ACTIONS FOR THE YEAR 1946, 154-164 (1946), cited in MOROENTHAU PRINCIPLES AND PROB-
LEMS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 112-20 (1950).
71. INTERNATIONAL JOINT CoMMISsIoN, RuLEs OF PROCEDURE & TEXT OF THE TREATY, OT-
TAWA, CANADA-WASHINGTON, D.C. (1965).
72. Waite, The International Joint Commission-Its Practice and Its Impact on Land Use,
13 BUFF. L. REv. 93, 101 (1963).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See R. Neibuhr, The Myth of World Government, THE NATION, March 16, 1946, at 312.
76. See Waite, supra note 72, at 102-17 for a detailed contrast between the written rules
of procedure, and what appears to be the actual procedures used, as revealed by the Dockets.
77. Rules of Procedure, 12(1), supra note 71.
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on its own initiative or as the result of an individual7 8 submitting
an application to his government to be forwarded to the Commission
on his behalf.79 The Commission retains jurisdiction after granting
an order approving a particular use. 0 Rule 13 deals with the tech-
nical nature and formal requirements of the application.8 ' Rule
14 deals with authorization of the project by the sponsoring govern-
ment when this is appropriate.8 2 Rule 15 is important in that it
requires newspaper publication in both countries "in . . . localities
which, in the opinion of the Commission, are most likely to be
affected by the proposed use, obstruction or diversion." s3 Rules 17
through 22 deal with statements in reply,8 supplemental or amended
application and statements,85 time allowances,6 interested persons and
counsel,87 consultation and witnesses and production of documents. s 8
Actual hearings are scheduled by the chairmen of the two sections,
written notice sent out to the parties involved and all hearings are
open to the public.89 The rules require that time be provided for
briefs and arguments by counsel. 90 It is discretionary whether testi-
mony be under oath,9 ' but the safeguard of cross-examination is man-
datory.9 2 Questions of admissibility of evidence are decided by the
Commission.9"
Reading the rules gives the impression that hearings are very
formal, but a description of a hearing dispels this notion.9 4 As
one commentator pointed out:
The Commission made it easy for anyone in attendance to
be heard. At the start of the meeting, the secretaries can-
vassed the audience for persons desiring to be heard, to as-
sure them they would be called on to speak.9 5
78. Id. at 12(1)(2).
79. The rule notes that:
Transmittal of the application to the Commission shall not be construed as
authorization by the Government of the use, obstruction or diversion pro-
posed by the applicant....
Rule 12(2).
80. Id. at 12(3).
81. The rule calls for at least two duplicate originals and 50 copies of all documenta
Rule 19(1).
82. Rule of Procedure 14(1), supra note 71.
83. Rule of Procedure 15(2) states:
[t~he notice shall state that the application has been receied, the nature and
locality of the proposed use, obstruction or diversion, the time within which
any person interested may present a statement in response to the Commission
and that the Commission will hold a hearing or hearings at which all persons
interested are entitled to be heard....
84. Rule of Procedure 17, supra note 71.
85. Id. at 18.
86. Id. at 19.
87. Id. at 20.
88. Id. at 21, 22.
89. Id. at 23(1),(2),(3).
90. Id. at (4).
91. Id. at (5).
92. Id.
98. Id. at (6), (7), (8).
94. See text accompanying note 73, infra.
95. Waito, supra note 72, at 108.
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It is perhaps good that the Commission hearings resemble more
a town meeting than a judicial proceeding since it would encourage
interested individuals to present their point of view.
2. Investigative Function
Article X of the Treaty states that questions or matters of
difference between the parties:
shall be referred from time to time to the International Joint
Commission for examination and report, whenever either the
Government of the United States or the Government of the
Dominion of Canada shall request that such questions or
matters of difference be so referred. 96
It is useful to compare the source of the Commission's investigative
powers (Article IX) to the provisions of Article VIII; both specifi-
cally state that applications from either government can go directly
to the Commission.97 On its face, Article IX does indeed seem
to allow the same type of unilateral application to the Commission.
However, in practice, one government may not obtain an investiga-
tion under Article IX without the concurrence of the other govern-
ment.98 According to one commentator, this is to "prevent either gov-
ernment from using the Commission as a means of prying into the
domestic concerns of the other." 99 Nevertheless, this modification
seems contrary to the intent of the drafters. 10 0
Article IX does not make reference to individuals. It is possible,
however, for individuals in either country to exert pressure on their
governments to intervene on their behalf. 10 The obvious problem
with this approach from an environmental perspective is that pres-
sure is a double edged sword, that is, if the government can be
pressurad to act one way, it must be assumed that it can be pressured
to act another way.10 2
When the Commission receives a reference, it appoints an ad-
visory board, consisting of the type of experts who would be best
able to deal with the particular problems of the reference. 0 3 Their
work is of a highly technical nature, often encompassing such fields
96. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. X, 36 Stat. 2448, (1910), T.S. No. 548.
97. Waite, supra note 72, at 108.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 107.
100. A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 365 (1961). (Must look to the language and sur-
rounding circumstances when seeking to judge the intent of a treaty).
101. Waite, supra note 72, at 111, citing Letter from Douglas McKay, then Chairman of
the United States Section of the IJC, to Carl F. Campbell, Baudette, Minn., April 28, 1959
(in General Correspondence File, Docket 73, Rainy River and Lake of the Woods Pollution
Reference).
102. For examples of Governments acting contrary to the public interest see M. GREN, B.
MOORE, & B. WASSERSTEIN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM (1972).
103. Waite, supra note 72 at 112. The terms of the reference usually suggest appropriate
fields of expertise from which to select board members. Id.
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as geography, hydrology, and geology. 0 4 The board, once appointed,
works unobtrusively, without public hearings, 05 possibly to free them
of public pressure. 0 6 The principle of protecting advisory boards
from public pressure is long establisehd in international practice. 0 7
The importance of the investigative role of the Commission has
increased over the years. Prior to 1944, 50 "cases" came before
the Commission, 39 were applications for approval of various works,
and 11 were references for investigation and recommendation. 0
However, since 1944 "references for investigation have outnumbered
applications by 21 to 13.'109
It would appear that the investigative function of the Commis-
sion is adequate to cope with the tasks that are properly assigned
to it.110 Of course, it should be remembered that the reports of
the Commission on references submitted to it are not decisions.
They are utilized by the two governments as a "basis for negotia-
tions of treaties, agreements or concurrent action to accomplish
the desired purposes.""'
3. Arbitrative Function"2
Article X details the arbitrative function of the Treaty."3s It
allows for the bringing of differences that arise between the two
parties to the Commission for arbitration, if requested by both par-
ties." 4 Under Article X, the Commission has investigative powers
as in Article IX, but goes further in that "once a reference is
made under Article X, it is made for 'decision' and not only as
in the case of Article IX, for 'examination and report.' ",15
If the Commissions' decision is split, then the Article calls for
an umpire, "chosen in accordance with the procedure prescribed
in the fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs of Article XLV of the
104. Note, supra note 43, at 506.
105. Canadian House of Common Debates, Oct. 29, 1962, answer by Prime Minister toQuestion No. 467; Official file, Docket 77 cited in Waite, supra note 72, at 115.
106. Waite, supra note 72 at 115.
107. See H. GinSON, RoAD To FOREIGN POLIcY 77 (1944).
108. International Joint Commission; International Conference on Water for Peace,
Matthew E. Welsh, Chairman of the United States Section of the International Joint Com-
mission, Washington, D.C., May 23-31, 1967.
109. Id.
110. See Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941), 85 AM. J. INT'L. L. 684
(1941).
111. Webar, Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers, JOURNAL OF THE
PowER DIvIsIoN, 177, 179 (No. 1968).
112. An examination of the Commission's administrative function under Article VI, is not
necessary due to the fact it pertains to measurement and apportionment of the St. Mary
and Milk Rivers.
113. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. X, 89 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548.
114. The Treaty uses the words, "may be referred", which indicates that the submission
Of the disputes to the Commission for arbitration is optional and not compulsory. Id.
115. L. BLOOMLD & G. FITZGERALD. aupra note 9, at 55, 56.
504
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Dis-
putes .... 116 The umpire is given the power to decide the question.117
This Article has never been used. It appears that neither country
wishes to bind themselves to a procedure that might work to their
disadvantage. For Article X to have any "teeth" it would have
to make arbitration possible at the request of one of the countries,
not both.11 8
IV POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR INDIVIDUAL CANADIANS IN-
JURED BY THE GARRISON DIVERSION PROJECT.
On the study of law, Oliver Wendel Holmes said:
The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction
of the incidence of the public force through the instrumental-
ity of the courts.
The means of the study are a body of reports, of treatises,
and statutes, in this country and England, extending back for
600 years .... 11 9
There is no vast body of law to fall back on when attempting
to predict what the Commission will do in a given set of circum-
stances. What little "law" the Commission has established must
be analogized to the given facts, while keeping in mind the intent
of the Treaty and the Treaty itself.
A. THE PROBLEM
Garrison Diversion is a vast irrigation project in the central
part of North Dakota with an interesting history120 and questioned
utility.121 Without discussing the environmental pros and cons of
the project,1 22 the basic Canadian objection shall be examined. 2 3
The salt level of the Red and Souris Rivers is being increased
because of the project, 2 4 causing possible injury to residents of
Manitoba.121 Assuming that the problem is real and that the Garrison
project is the cause of a riparian owner suffering a loss-what
recourse has he under the Treaty?
The 1909 Treaty was concerned primarily with navigation and
diversion of waters along and flowing across the boundary. 2 6 This
116. Id.
117. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, January 11, 1909, art. X, 36 Stat. 2448, (1910), T.S. No. 548.
118. See 0. YOUNG, THE POLITICS OF FORCE: BARGAINING DURING INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
(1968).
119. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 61 (1879).
120. Note, Selected Environmental Law Aspects of the Garrison Diversion Project, 50
N.D.L. REV. 329, 332 (1974).
121. G. SHERwOOD, NEW WOUNDS FOR OLD PRAIRIEs (1972).
122. See U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, INITIAL STAGE GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT FI-
NAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 1-80 (1974).
123. Note, supra note 120, at 332.
124. Id.
125. Grand Forks Herald, Sept. 17, 1973, at 1, col. 2.
126. Mc~affrey, Trans-Boundary Pollution Injuries: Jurisdictional Considerations in Private
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is one reason127 that the only mention of private remedies is found
in Article II, which "authorizes free use and diversion of inland
waters, but creates private rights of action for extraterritorial in-
juries caused by such diversions. 1 28 Suits have not been filed under
this provision.'2
It is well established that aliens have free access to American
courts in pollution matters.130 Cases involving pollution damage
to land outside the jurisdiction have found the land owner's suits
to be "personal and not local."13' On the subject one commentator
said:
Implicit in his holding is the suggestion that since the action
for damages was founded upon a nuisance theory, it did not
claim a trespassory invasion of property rights, but a non-
trespassory interference with defendants' use and enjoyment
of their land. 3 2
In other words, since damages were sought from the defendant
personally, the judgment would be effective without control over
the injured property. 33 It appears that Canadians aggrieved by pol-
lution originating in the United States which detrimentally affects
them would have no problem suing in an American court on a
nuisance theory. 34
An obscure avenue that an injured Canadian might explore in
his suit against an American polluter is the jurisdiction given to
Federal District Courts:
The District Court shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.'
35
The Trail Smelter Arbitration decided pollution violates the law
of nations. 13 6 Regarding pollution, it said:
[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a mariner as to cause injury . . . in or to
the territory of another, or the property of persons here-
in ... . 137
Litigation Between Canada and the United States, 3 CALIF. W. INT'L. L.J. 191, 20S (1972-73)
It was at the insistence of the United States that pollution was menloned only once in the
whole treaty. Jordan, Great Lakes Pollution: A Framework for Action, 5 OT7owA L. RAv.
65, 67 (1971).
127. McCaffrey, supra note 126, at 204.
128. Id. at 209.
129. Letter from John Crook, Counsel for the United States Section of the International
Joint Commission and Attorney, Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of State, Novem-
ber 10, 1972, cited in McCaffrey, supra note 126 at 204.
130. Takkahashi v. Fish & Game Comm., 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
131. Ducktown Sulphur, Cooper & Iron Co. v. Barns, 60 S.W. 593 (Tenn. 1900).
132. McCaffrey, supra note 26, at 226.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 224.
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1970).
186. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963 (1941) cited in 35 AM. J. INT'i.
L. 684 (1941).
137. 1.
NOTE
It is established by Article IV that trans-boundary pollution violates
the treaty. " It would appear then that a United States District Court
would have jurisdiction in a pollution suit brought by a Canadian as
a result of pollution caused by Garrison Diversion.
Another alternative a Canadian might pursue would be securing
the intervention of this government on his behalf1 39 for as noted
earlier," 0 individuals do not have standing before the Commission.
If the government does intervene for its citizens, two possible alter-
natives are available. The first is securing the investigation of the
alleged pollution by the Commission under Article IX,' 1 ' as was
done by the United States in the Trail Smelter dispute.1 4 2 The second
alternative would be to attempt to secure the consent of the other
government to arbitration under Article X." Under this alternative,
both countries would be bound by the decision.1 4 '
CONCLUSION
Many people in the United States and Canada have the impres-
sion that the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 is a panacea for*
trans-boundary environmental problems. This simply is not the case.
The Tereaty was created out of specific political needs of the two
governments: Canada's desire to handle its own intra-continental
affairs instead of being subject to Britain's desire to intervene on
their behalf on a conflict by conflict basis; the United States' desire
to enter into an agreement with Canada so that it might find a
home for its very nationalistic interpretation of international riripar-
ian law, the Harmon Doctrine. While the desire for a workable
system of conflict resolution played an important part inducing the
parties to come to an agreement, it was secondary to the above
mentioned political ends that both countries were desirous to achieve.
The International Joint Commission was a product of the Treaty
and the political desires that brought that Treaty into being. In
analyzing the functions and procedures of the Commission, especially
the requirement that governments, not individuals, initiate actions,
the conclusion that conflict resolution was not that important to
the drafters seems inescapable.
The Boundary Waters Treaty, like many such agreements, solved
138. Treaty with Great Britain Reloting to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. IV, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548.
139. McCaffrey, supra note 126, at 205.
140. See text accompanying note 56, supra.
141. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. IX, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548.
142. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941 cited in 85 AM. J. INT'L. L.
684 (1941).
143. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. X, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548.
144. 0. YOUNG, BU3ra note 118, at 4.
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some of the immediate difficulties between the parties at the time
of its inception, but clearly is not the final answer to settling trans-
boundary water problems. 14
PETER PANTALEO
145. The Commission itself recognized that the framework which it is currently operating
under is not adequate to cope with current pollution problems. See Communique on Canada-
United States Ministerial Meeting on Great Lakes Pollution, Washington, D.C., June 10,
1971, in which two proposals are made to strengthen the Commission. (1) An agreement
sheuld be entered into by both countries establishing common water quality control by ob-
jectives and the agreement should impose binding commitments on both countries to con-
struct treatment facilities to reduce pollution levels on the lakes. (2) The parties agreed
that more power and authority should be given to the Commission to assist the govern-
ments in protecting the water quality of the Great Lakes. Id. at 3.
These steps if implemented by the governments would make the Commission a "more
effective international agency for achievemnt of water quality control . . ." Jordan, Great
Lakes Pollution: A Frameiwork for Action, 5 O'1AwA L. Rsv. 65, 81-2 (1971).
